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NOTES
gal searches can reduce the chances of conviction. 4 The court
concluded that: "The result of applying an exclusionary rule to
cases such as the one at Bench would be to free a guilty man
without any assurance that there would result any counter-
balancing restraint on similar conduct in the future." 5 The
Nelson court did not consider the question of the effectiveness'
of exclusionary policy in deterring private illegal searches-
certainly if exclusion does not deter them, the Nelson rule
will significantly handicap law enforcement while providing
little additional protection for potential victims.
Certainly the Nelson rule is not designed simply to set
guilty shoplifters free; rather the court has tried to strike a
closer balance between the security requirements of merchants
and the rights of their customers to be free from unreasonable
searches.6 The new rule does not encompass all private
searches but instead applies only to those initiated by a private
party acting under some statutory authorization. Louisiana
courts in the future may choose to limit this rule to article 215
detention cases, or, still further, to actions by large security
forces under article 215. 7 Nonetheless, while the size of the step
has yet to be determined, the Louisiana Supreme Court has
stepped away from the previously strict rule that the constitu-
tional standards governing search and seizure do not apply to
searches by private persons.
Shaun B. Rafferty
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN LoUISIANA-THE REJECTION OF THE
LOCALITY RULE AS APPLIED TO SPECIALISTS
The wife and children of the decedent sued his cardiovas-
cular surgeon for wrongful death. Although the defendant had
complied with local practices,' the testimony of a specialist
64. 250 Cal. App. 2d at 482-83, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 416. See also State v. Mora, 307
So. 2d 317 (La. 1975), wherein Justice Summers, in dissent, argued that exclusion does
not deter private unconstitutional conduct.
65. People v. Botts, 250 Cal. App. 2d 778, 482-83, 58 Cal. Rptr. 412, 416 (1967).
66. Note, supra note 35, at 964.
67. See note 57, supra.
1. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1333 (La. 1978).
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from another, but similar, community indicated that such
practices were negligent.' Both the trial court and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeal held the evidence inadmissible under
the "locality rule."'3 The supreme court reversed and held that
the duty of a specialist is governed by the standard of care
practiced within the specialty itself, regardless of the standard
of the locality. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident and Indem-
nity Co., 360 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1978).
The basis for all delictual responsibility in Louisiana is
article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code,4 which requires every
person to repair the damage caused by his fault. Fault is de-
fined by article 2316 as encompassing negligence, imprudence,
or want of skill.5 Fault has also been described by the courts
as the breach of a legal duty owed by one party to another.'
Louisiana law imposes upon a physician the duty to exer-
cise reasonable care and skill in the treatment of his patients.!
In medical malpractice actions, the fact that the patient died
does not result in a presumption that the physician was negli-
gent;' on the contrary, the physician is presumed to have
treated the patient in the "usual and customary" manner? To
overcome this presumption, the plaintiff must establish the
required standard of care10 and prove the physician's failure to
2. Id.
3. Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 225 La. 618, 623, 73 So. 2d 781, 782
(1953), sets out the locality rule as follows:
A physician, surgeon, or dentist .. . is not required to exercise the highest
degree of skill and care possible. As a general rule it is his duty to exercise the
degree of skill ordinarily employed, under similar circumstances, by the mern-
bers of his profession in good standing in the same community or locality, and
to use reasonable care and diligence, along with his best judgment, in the appli-
cation of his skill to the case.
See also Comment, The Medical Malpractice Action in Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV. 420
(1973).
4. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1074, 249 So. 2d 133, 136(1971).
5. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2316.
6. Callais v. Allstate Ins. Co., 344 So. 2d 692 (La. 1976); Langlois v. Allied Chem.
Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So. 2d 133 (1971); see also Comment, supra note 3, at 421.
7. See, e.g., Phelps v. Donaldson, 234 La. 1118, 150 So. 2d 35 (1963); Dowling v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 168 So. 2d 107 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
8. See, e.g., Freche v. Mary, 16 So. 2d 213 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944); Mournet v.
Sumner, 19 La. App. 346, 139 So. 728 (Orl. Cir. 1932).
9. Mournet v. Sumner, 19 La. App. 346, 350, 139 So. 728, 730 (Orl. Cir. 1932).
10. LA. R.S. 9:2794 (Supp. 1975). Generally the plaintiff has to use expert testi-
mony to establish the physician's standard of care, but there are some situations where
expert testimony is not necessary. See notes 25-31, infra, and accompanying text.
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meet that standard." Failure by the plaintiff to meet either
burden will result in a summary judgment or a directed verdict
for the defendant.
The standard of care for a physician, prior to Ardoin, was
set out in Meyer v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co.'2 as the
duty to exercise the degree of skill ordinarily employed, under
similar circumstances, by the members of his profession in
good standing in the same community or locality. A physician
was further charged to use reasonable care and diligence, along
with his best judgment, in applying his skill to a case. The
"locality rule" espoused in Meyer resulted in geographical limi-
tations on the admissibility of evidence concerning the physi-
cian's duty of care.
The line of decisions which culminated in the locality rule
in Meyer is interesting. The first attempt to place limits on
the duty owed by a physician to his patient was Stern v. Lang, 13
which held that an oculist must exercise the care and skill
usually exercised by oculists in good standing within the pro-
fession. Stern was not cited in Roark v. Peters, "1 the court's
next attempt to limit the physician's duty of care. Rather, the
authority cited by the court in reshaping this duty was a com-
mon law encyclopedia.' 5 In Roark the court went much further
than Stern and stated that testimony concerning the standard
required of a profession would be limited to opinions of experts
from "similar localities."
Lower courts' views of a physician's duty to his patients
varied, even after Roark. One court, citing the same common
law authority as Roark, limited the physician's duty to the
practices usually followed in the same or similar communi-
ties." Other courts still held to the Stern standard requiring the
care and skill usually exercised by physicians in good standing
within the profession, without restricting it to the practices
usually employed in the same or similar communities.'7 Yet
11. LA. R.S. 9:2794 (Supp. 1975).
12. 225 La. 618, 623, 73 So. 2d 781, 782 (1953).
13. 106 La. 738, 31 So. 303 (1901).
14. 162 La. 111, 110 So. 106 (1926).
15. Id. at 115, 110 So. at 108. The court cited the Cyclopedia of Law and Proce-
dure, 30 Cyc. Physicians and Surgeons 1570 (1908).
16. Mournet v. Sumner, 19 La. App. 346, 139 So. 728 (Orl. Cir. 1932).
17. Brashears v. Peak, 19 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944); Freche v. Mary,
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another court, citing Roark as authority, restricted the physi-
cian's standard of care to the practices usually employed
within the same community.'" Under this stricter rule, evi-
dence of practices in other communities, even if they were simi-
lar to the community involved, was not admissible to prove the
physician's duty to his patient.'9
This confused state of the law formed the backdrop for the
decision in Meyer.2" Meyer held that a physician's duty of care
to his patient is limited to the customary practices in the same
community. The court was not confronted with the admissibil-
ity of practices in similar communities as the plaintiff had no
evidence other than the injury itself of improper conduct by the
physician. Further, it did not openly acknowledge any devia-
tion from prior jurisprudence and indeed cited Stern and Roark
as authority for its pronouncement.
Uncertainty as to whether the "same community" stan-
dard was to be strictly applied resulted in haphazard applica-
tion of the standard. The First Circuit2' and the Louisiana
Supreme Court" allowed testimony by New Orleans physicians
regarding their standard of practice at the trial of a Baton
Rouge physician. However, the trial court and the Third Cir-
cuit in Ardoin23 strictly followed Meyer and held that evidence
of the practices of a Baton Rouge specialist was inadmissible
at the trial of a Lafayette specialist.
While "same" is a more extreme limitation than
"similar," both involve the inadmissibility of evidence from
outside certain communities. Such restrictions on the availa-
bility of expert testimony help to foster a "conspiracy of si-
16 So. 2d 213 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944); Comeaux v. Miles, 9 La. App. 66, 118 So. 786
(Orl. Cir. 1928).
18. Wells v. McGehee, 39 So. 2d 196 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949).
19. Id.
20. In Meyer, a surgeon and an anesthetist failed to examine plaintiff's teeth
closely for looseness before commencing a nasal endotracheal intubation preparatory
to the extraction of all her teeth. Apart from the question of causality, the court found
that while one tooth dislodged and fell into her lung, the defendants did all that
reasonably careful practitioners skilled in their professions could have done. 225 La.
at 629, 73 So. 2d at 785.
21. Henry v. McCool, 239 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
22. Uter v. Bone & Joint Clinic, 249 La. 851, 192 So. 2d 100 (1966).
23. 350 So. 2d 205 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 360 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1978).
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lence," 24 because the testimony must come from physicians
who come from the same area as the defendant and who are
reticent to testify against their colleague. The more stringent
the restriction, the more difficult it is for the plaintiff to obtain
the expert testimony he needs.
To ameliorate the substantial burden that is placed on the
plaintiff, the judiciary and the legislature have devised ways to
circumvent the need for expert testimony. The application of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is one judicially accepted way
of escaping a summary judgment or a directed verdict for the
defendant when the plaintiff's injury is his only evidence of the
physician's negligence. However, the doctrine's application has
been restricted in medical malpractice actions to cases where
the facts suggest the defendant's negligence as the most plausi-
ble explanation for the plaintiffs injury. 5 Additionally, al-
though use of the doctrine may allow the plaintiff to escape a
summary judgment or a directed verdict, it does not automati-
cally result in a favorable decision.
Another device aiding malpractice plaintiffs was employed
in a First Circuit case which treated certain actions of physi-
cians and surgeons as negligent as a matter of law, even if they
were shown to be customary practices. 7 If a customary practice
subjects a patient to an unreasonable risk of harm," then the
24. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1337 (La.
1978).
25. The Work of the Louisiana Legislature for the 1976 Regular Session-Torts,
37 LA. L. Rv. 112, 122 (1976). The judiciary has applied res ipsa loquitur to a variety
of situations: See, e.g., McCann v. Baton Rouge Gen. Hosp., 276 So. 2d 259 (La. 1973)
(an injury suffered to a part of the body not directly involved in the treatment); Grant
v. Touro Infirmary, 254 La. 204, 223 So. 2d 148 (1969) (a sponge pad unintentionally
left in body after surgery); Chappetta v. Ciaravella, 311 So. 2d 563 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974) (a sponge pad unintentionally left in body after surgery); Davis v. Southern
Baptist Hosp., 293 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (an unintended burn suffered
during medical care); Andrepont v. Oschner, 84 So. 2d 63 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955)
(an explosion or fire caused by a substance used in the treatment).
26. Regardless of the quality of the defendant's rebuttals, res ipsa loquitur
merely infers negligence on the part of the defendant, and it is up to the fact finder,
after consideration of all the evidence, to decide if the inference is strong enough to
warrant a recovery for the plaintiff. Malone, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Proof by Infer-
ence-A Discussion of the Louisiana Cases, 4 LA. L. REv. 70, 90 (1941).
27. Favalora v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 144 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
Here, the court found that the failure to take precautions to keep a woman with a
history of fainting spells from falling during an X-ray was negligence as a matter of
law, regardless of local practices.
28. Id.
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court will disregard the custom and say what standard is re-
quired. 9 This is obviously a much stronger judicial reaction to
a defendant's conduct than merely permitting an inference of
negligence; no amount of expert testimony on the standard of
care will change the result. A recent example of how courts
apply the negligence per se test is Helling v. Carey,3 0 in which
the failure to timely administer an eye pressure test which
would have disclosed glaucoma resulted in irreparable eye
damage. The customary practice of opthalmologists had not
called for administering the test to people under the age of forty
because glaucoma occurs only once in every 25,000 people
under that age. The plaintiff was only twenty-two years old
when she first experienced difficulty with her eyes and con-
sulted the defendant specialists. The court held that the failure
to administer the eye test was negligence as a matter of law,
finding that the test was simple and inexpensive to administer
and that there was no doubt that evidence of glaucoma could
have been detected by its use.3
Supplementing these judicial devices designed to ease the
plaintiff's burden is legislation that was passed in 1975. Re-
vised Statutes 40:1299.47 established a procedure whereby
pretrial screening panels review medical malpractice claims.32
Each panel is comprised of three physicians and a nonvoting
attorney.13 Since service on the panel is mandatory, and since
the panel is required to render an expert opinion on whether
the health care provider was negligent, this statute helps break
through the conspiracy of silence.
The instant case3 involved a coronary artery by-pass oper-
ation. The patient's heart was being connected to a heart-lung
29. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932). In this case the court stated:
[In most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly
it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption
of new and available devices. It never may set its own tests, however persuasive
be its usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions
so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.
Id.
30. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
31. Id. at 516-17, 519 P.2d at 983.
32. 1975 La. Acts, No. 817, adding LA. R.S. 40:1299.47. See Comment, Recent
Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL L. Rlv. 655, 679 (1976).
33. Id.
34. 360 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1978).
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machine. The tubes to be connected with the patient's heart
either sucked blood or pumped air, depending on how the
highly trained attendant attached them to the patient's heart;
they pumped air instead of sucking blood, and Mr. Ardoin died
instantly from a massive air embolism. Since the functioning
of the tubes can be checked by dipping their ends into the pool
of blood in the patient's open chest cavity, or in some other
sterile liquid, the surgeon was asked why he had not done this.
His defense was that the customary practice of the community
did not require it. When evidence was offered to show that the
customary practice of a similar community did require check-
ing the tubes, the evidence was excluded as inadmissible under
the locality rule.
The court in Ardoin held that Louisiana courts were no
longer to be governed by the locality rule in determining
whether an act of a medical specialist that causes damage to
his patient constitutes fault. In reevaluating Louisiana's posi-
tion on the locality rule, the court noted that the rule was being
applied inconsistently, 3 that it was based on the common law
of Louisiana's sister states, 3' and that it was being abandoned
by courts throughout the country. The court's conclusion that
the locality rule should be dispensed with was based on a re-
view of the Louisiana Civil Code' and the retroactive applica-
tion of a recent statute .39
35. See text at notes 20-23, supra.
36. See note 15, supra.
37. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1338 (La.
1978). The court noted that many jurisdictions are aligning themselves with the posi-
tion advocated by the American Law Institute and abandoning entirely the locality
rule as applied to specialists. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SECOND) § 299A, comment
(d) (1965). The court further noted that those states which apply the "same locality"
rule are a distinct minority. 360 So. 2d at 1337-38.
38. LA. Civ. CoDE arts. 2315, 2316.
39. 1975 La. Acts, No. 807, adding LA. R.S. 9:2794. The statute provides:
A. In a malpractice action based on the negligence of a physician licensed under
R.S. 37:1261 et seq ... the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving:
(1) The degree of knowledge or skill possessed or the degree of care ordinarily
exercised by physicians or dentists practicing in the same community or locality
to that in which the defendant practices; and where the defendant practices in
a particular specialty and where the alleged acts of medical negligence raise
issues peculiar to the particular medical specialty involved, then the plaintiff
has the burden of proving the degree of care ordinarily practiced by physicians
or dentists within the involved medical specialty.
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In disposing of the notion that stare decisis controls in
Louisiana, the court reasoned that while case law is invaluable
as previous interpretation of the legislative will, it is neverthe-
less secondary authority.' Accordingly, the court looked first
to the broad standard of article 2315.1' Neither it, nor article
2316 which defines fault, places geographical or occupational
limits on the notion of fault or on the standard of care against
which a person's actions are measured. A review of the legis-
lation revealed no such restrictions on a physician's standard
of conduct. Beside this void of legislative mandate for the local-
ity rule was placed a basic tenet of our legal philosophy, that
civil and criminal sanctions imposed for socially unaccepted
conduct should be applied equally throughout the state to all
citizens within the same class or set of circumstances." The
court concluded that localized definitions of negligence should
not be allowed to contravene this basic policy unless there is
clear evidence of legislative will to the contrary. 3
The search for legislative expression was not limited to the
Civil Code. The court examined the medical malpractice legis-
lation which had been passed in 1975, subsequent to Mr. Ar-
doin's death, but prior to the adjudication of the instant case.
In particular, Revised Statutes 40:2794 was scrutinized closely.
The lower court had read the statute as codifying the locality
rule as to general practitioners and specialists." However, the
supreme court concluded that the statute unambiguously
abrogated the locality rule as applied to specialists. 5 The
court appeared to be influenced by the fact that special treat-
ment would run counter to the general policy of having a uni-
form standard of care. 46
40. 360 So. 2d at 1336. See also Barham, Methodology of the Civil Law in
Louisiana, 50 TUL. L. Rv. 474 484 (1976).
41. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2315. See Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067,
249 So. 2d 133 (1971). See also Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana, 17 TuL. L. Rv. 159,
163 (1942).
42. 360 So. 2d at 1336.
43. Id.
44. 350 So. 2d 205, 219 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 360 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1978).
The Third Circuit opinion read the statute as codifying the locality rule as to all
physicians, including specialists. Id. For the text of section 2794, see note 39, supra.
45. 360 So. 2d at 1335.
46. Id. at 1336. The court stated:
If the legislature were to act contrary to this policy by establishing a different
[Vol. 39
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In its comparative analysis, the court consciously disre-
garded Meyer; indeed, it chastised the lower court for consider-
ing section 2794 as affecting Meyer. It may be in keeping with
proper civilian analysis to deprecate reliance on judicial deci-
sions; they are, after all, merely interpretations of the legisla-
tive will.'" However, interpreting new legislation only as it af-
fects prior legislation, without taking into consideration the
judicial gloss placed on such prior legislation, may not always
lead to an accurate picture of the legislature's intent. This is
particularly true when the prior legislation is article 2315. This
article was written broadly in recognition of the unlimited
number of factual situations involving delictual responsibility
that can arise. Rather than attempt to anticipate these situa-
tions, the legislation presents a very broad statement of one's
responsibility to others, thereby inviting judicial interpretation
and entrusting to the courts the task of keeping the concept of
fault up to date."8
In the face of a trend in other states away from a strict
locality rule,4 the Louisiana legislature passed section 2794.
While interpretation of the statute as abrogating the locality
rule as to specialists is not clearly erroneous, it does not appear
to have been the intent of the legislators. However, the su-
preme court did not consider the statute ambiguous, hence, it
did not discuss legislative intent.5
The statute that resulted from the legislature's efforts per-
haps provides a lesson in drafting a bill. The original version
definition of negligence, imprudence or want of skill by a medical specialist
within each locality, the lawmaking body would express its intention explicitly.
Since La. R.S. 9:2794 contains no such expression pertaining to medical special-
ists, the statute should not be given the effect of Balkanizing those representing
themselves as having superior skill or knowledge beyond that common to the
medical profession by the application of varying geographic standards of fault.
47. Id. See Barham, supra note 40, at 484.
48. Langlois v. Allied Chem. Corp., 258 La. 1067, 1078, 249 So. 2d 133, 137 (1971).
49. See note 37, supra.
50. Civil Code article 18 commends investigation into legislative intent as an aid
in the interpretation of ambiguous legislation. It states that "[tihe universal and most
effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when its expressions are
dubious, is by considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which induced the
Legislature to enact it." LA. CIv. CODE art. 18 (emphasis added). However, it is not
appropriate to look to intent unless the words are ambiguous. See Nash v. Whitten,
326 So. 2d 856 (La. 1976); Whitney Nat'l Bank v. James, 189 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1966).
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of the statute simply mandated that physicians and dentists
exercise "the degree of care ordinarily exercised by physicians
or dentists practicing the same specialty in similar communi-
ties to that in which the defendant practices."'" However, in an
effort to make the bill more closely track the jurisprudence, a
friendly amendment was offered and accepted.5" This version
ultimately became section 2794, but it unintentionally abro-
gated the locality rule as applied to specialists." That the legis-
lature was attempting to codify the locality rule as to all physi-
cians becomes clear when this statute is compared with Re-
vised Statutes 40:1299.41(A), another part of the 1975 legisla-
tive package containing section 2794.11 This provision was au-
thored by the same person who authored section 2794, and in
codifying the locality rule for health care providers, it included
specialists.55 Thus, interpreting section 2794 as abrogating the
51. La. H.B. 637, 1st Reg. Sess. (1975).
52. OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, 1st Reg. Sess. at 1520 (June 19, 1975). The bill as originally
introduced simply provided that the plaintiff had the burden of proof as to "the degree
of knowledge or skill possessed or the degree of care ordinarily exercised by physicians
or dentists practicing the same specialty in similar communities to that in which the
defendant practices." La. H.B. 637, 1st Reg. Sess. (1975) (emphasis added). An
amendment was offered and accepted which deleted the words "the same specialty"
and added new language after "practices" concerning specialists. The new language
required proof of the standard of care within a specialty, but did not place any geo-
graphical limitations on this proof. Apparently this change was intended to insure that
a general practitioner could not testify as to the standard of care of a specialist, a
continuation of prior jurisprudence.
53. In 1977 it became apparent that the statute could be viewed as abrogating
the locality rule as to specialists. See Percle v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 349
So. 2d 1289 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977). The representative who had offered the friendly
amendment to the statute in 1975 introduced House Bill 635 to correct his mistake.
This bill failed, but it would have clearly codified the locality rule as to specialists.
La. H.B. 635, 4th Reg. Sess. (1978), provided:
[Wihere the defendant practices in a particular specialty and where the alleged
acts of medical negligence raise issues peculiar to the particular medical spe-
cialty involved,. then the plaintiff has the burden of proving the degree of care
ordinarily practiced by physicians or dentists in the same community or locality
to that in which the defendant practices within the involved medical specialty.
54. LA. R.S. 40:1299.41 (A) (Supp. 1975).
55. Id. Section 1299.41 (A)(7) provides:
'Tort' means any breach of duty or any negligent act or omission proximately
causing injury or damage to another. The standard of care required of every
health care provider, except a hospital, in rendering professional services or
health care to a patient, shall be to exercise that degree of skill ordinarily
employed, under similar circumstances, by the members of his profession in
[Vol. 39
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locality rule for specialists is inconsistent with section
1299.41(A)."
The court's decision in Ardoin further eases the plaintiffs
burden, giving him greater access to expert testimony. The
locality rule was abandoned in recognition of the changing real-
ities of the medical field, because, as the court noted, whatever
may have justified a locality rule in the past no longer holds
true today.5" Advances in communication and education have
dissipated, the disparities in heath care that once existed be-
tween the various communities to the point where physicians
can no longer legitimately claim the protections afforded by the
locality rule. 8
In evaluating the effect of Ardoin, it should be noted that
its impact may be negated by the operation of Revised Statutes
40:1299.47. The mandatory pretrial screening panels set up by
section 1299.47 consist of three local physicians, and the preju-
dicial effect of an adverse panel report at a subsequent trial
might be virtually impossible for a plaintiff to overcome." This
could effectively retain the locality rule in fact, though not in
law. 0
One possible effect of the court's decision may be that the
exception to the locality rule for the specialist will swallow the
rule. In this age of specialization, the only one presently able
to utilize the locality rule, the general practitioner, is being
replaced by the specialist in family care. Since the family care
good standing in the same community or locality, and to use reasonable care
and diligence, along with his best judgment, in the application of his skill.
(Emphasis added).
56. In 1978, shortly after the court's decision in Ardoin, the legislature passed
Act 611, which amended Revised Statutes 40:1299.39 (Supp. 1975). This statute dealt
with the state's malpractice liability for state services. Modeled much like section
1299.41, which dealt with medical malpractice generally, it too, had defined the stan-
dard of care of health providers in terms of the locality rule. Now, however, Act 611
draws a distinction between health care providers in general and those practicing in a
recognized field of specialty. The locality rule remains applicable to general health care
providers, but the specialist is to be judged by the general standard of care practiced
within the medical specialty.
57. 360 So. 2d at 1337.
58. Id.
59. Comment, supra note 32, at 681.
60. Id. The court might choose to follow the lead of Florida in this regard. Florida
only admits the panel's conclusions of law at the trial; its findings of fact are excluded
in an attempt to downplay any possible prejudicial effects. Id. at n.120.
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specialist is subject to uniform education, testing, and certifi-
cation procedures as in any recognized medical specialty, he
should logically be covered by the Ardoin rule, too. If this hap-
pens, the locality rule will no longer apply to anyone.
The retroactive application of section 2794 is a disturbing
aspect of Ardoin. The difficulty in applying the statute retroac-
tively is that the locality rule is both a rule of substantive law
and a rule of evidence. Article 8 of the Louisiana Civil Code
specifically states that "[a] law can prescribe only for the
future, it can have no retrospective operation .... ." Exceptions
to this general prohibition have been recognized by the judici-
ary, and statutes remedial or procedural in nature are generally
given retroactive effect, unless there is language to the con-
trary.6' This exception would include that part of the locality
rule which addresses itself to the admissibility of evidence,
since that part is clearly procedural. However, that part of the
rule which limits a physician's duty to his patient to the prac-
tices usually employed by local physicians is closer to a sub-
stantive rule. The actions of a doctor occurring before Ardoin
will now be judged by a standard of care of which no doctor
could have been aware prior to this litigation. There was no
warning of the need to comply with practices being utilized
by specialists throughout the nation.
Even if there had been no locality rule, it seems doubtful
that the specialist in the instant case would have acted differ-
ently. However, the next decision which applies this statute
retroactively may work a real injustice. If a defendant would
have adjusted his conduct to nationwide standards in order to
avoid liability, then it is not fair to penalize him for actions
which he did not know were wrongful. This seems to be exactly
the situation which Civil Code article 8 was enacted to avoid.
There were ways for the Ardoin court to avoid the possible
injustice of retroactively applying section 2794. The court could
have prospectively overruled Meyer and then placed an effec-
tive date on its interpretation of the statute.2 The court could
also have held that the defendant specialist was negligent as a
61. Dowie v. Becker, 149 La. 160, 88 So. 777 (1921); Hammond Asphalt Co., Inc.
v. Joiner, 270 So. 2d 244 (La. App. lst Cir. 1972).
62. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932); see also
Barnett v. Develle, 289 So. 2d 129 (La. 1974).
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matter of law, without referring to the standards of the profes-
sion, local or otherwise. This would have obviated the need for
a discussion of the locality rule and the effects of recent legisla-
tion upon it. The rationale of Helling v. Carey3 could have
been adopted, because the test of the machine's functioning
was simple to administer, involved no extra cost to the patient,
and almost certainly would have prevented the fatal air embo-
lism. 4 However, the court chose a different route and, instead,
remanded the case to let a new jury hear all pertinent evidence
unburdened by the locality rule restrictions. The court may
have felt that it was time to discard the locality rule and the
results that it tends to promote.
As for the future, the court has made it very clear that
unless the legislature reacts and passes legislation which un-
mistakably codifies the locality rule for specialists, they will be
held to a standard of care as practiced within their particular
medical specialty. From the standpoint of predictability, the
court has made itself very clear, and that is to be commended.
Gordon Terry Whitman
63. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). For a discussion of practices deter-
mined to be negligent as a matter of law, see text at notes 27-31, supra.
64. See text at note 30, supra.
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